I. INTRODUCTION
The effects upon performance of quantitative variation in amount of reinforcement is a realm of motivation theory which, for unaccountable reasons, has been a stepchild compared to the considerable body of research upon the parallel problem of the effects of variation in drive. Treatises upon behavior (6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17) have naturally been forced to raise the problem as no presentation of motivation could otherwise be presumed to be complete. More often than not, however, because of the scarcity of data, they have relied upon the results of an early study by Grindley (4) as definitive despite the fact that, as shall be shown, it is characterized by a number of serious methodological weaknesses. The most recent systematic treatment of behavior theory, the Principles of behavior by Clark L. Hull, is not entirely an exception to this rule. Though two later researches are utilized, one by Gantt (3) and one by Wolfe and Kaplon (16) , which bear indirectly upon the problem, Grindley's results are still given heavy weight. These additional studies give Hull a somewhat broader base for theorizing than his predecessors, but he is still led to some generalizations which, owing to the meagerness of the data, are rather more speculation than inference.
The object of the present paper is to subject Hull's treatment of quantitative variation of incentive and performance to criticism and amplification in the light of a recent series of experiments by the writer (2) . On the basis of this ap-*A critique of Hull's treatment with an alternative theory of incentive motivation.
praisal the writer will be led to reject Hull's strength-of-conditioning explanation of the effects of incentive variation upon action. Suggested in its stead will be a theory grounded upon emotional drive.
Before bringing the present writer's findings to bear upon Hull's analysis, it is advantageous to present to the reader some of the general shortcomings of the investigations from which Hull has largely drawn his facts.
II. CRITICISMS OF PROCEDURES
1. Drive control.-In inquiries concerned with the effects of different amounts of incentive upon behavior obviously drive, the internal complementary aspect of motivation, must be held constant. Variations of performance cannot be ascribed to variations in amount of food incentive, for example, if hunger drive is varying simultaneously. Certainly there must be a drive, for incentives can only be defined as objects appropriate to the satisfaction of a drive, but the amount of drive should not be a variable. On the grounds of this requirement Hull's key sources of information-the studies of Grindley (4), Gantt (3) , and Wolfe and Kaplon (16) -are all questionable. In Grindley's study of chickens with rice as the variable incentive, there was no apparent control of amount of rice eaten by the various incentive-amount groups. All that Grindley says is that "when they had been tested they were given a large meal of rice. At other feeding times they had no rice" (4, p. 175). Further, there was no assurance that the time of arousal of hunger-contractions 341 was controlled. 1 The statement appears that "the experiments were always made at a time when the chicks were hungry" (4, p. 175) which is an interpretation, not a statement of conditions.
Wolfe and Kaplon (16) , in their experiment with chickens receiving different amounts of popcorn as incentives, had a trial regimen of five successive trials twice a day. Such a procedure destroys equalization of drive. If various groups of animals receive different amounts of incentive upon their initial trial, upon any subsequent trial the assumption can no longer be made that drive is constant among the groups. Performance after the initial trial would be a function not only of incentive variation but of drive variation. Gantt (3) also had several trials a day in his study of dogs with food as the variable incentive. So he too may be open to the same objections.
2. Appetitive range.-It is reasonable to assert that before any overall generalizations can be made about the influence of amount of incentive upon level of performance the amounts investigated must cover the major portion of the appetitive range 2 of the animal investigated. With respect to this reasonable requirement Hull's sources of information are seriously weak. Grindley's spread of incentive-amount variation was from one to six grains of ricecertainly a minute per cent of the appetitive range even for a chick. Wolfe and Kaplon used the even smaller spread of one quarter to one grain of popcorn. Gantt's study was somewhat better in this respect, varying from onehalf gram to twelve grams of food. But 1 According to Bousfield and Elliot (1) hunger drive is probably more dependent upon the occurrence of hunger contractions than simply upon time of deprivation.
2 This term will be employed to denote amount of incentive, e.g., food, which is just sufficient to maintain a particular animal for one day. the latter amount is still not a substantial fraction of the appetitive range of a dog.
3. Statistical rigor.-The last basis of criticism is statistical. Hull's sources of information have some serious deficiencies in this regard. In Grindley's experiment there was no statistical analysis of the results, and with his observation that there were 'wide individual differences in behavior' even Grindley thought that the experiment was not sufficiently accurate to establish the results with certainty.
Grindley's sampling procedure was also dubious. Thirteen chicks or over 25 per cent of the group were thrown out because "they were found to develop a dislike for rice during the experiments." The writer will contend later that by this procedure he missed an important fact.
Wolfe and Kaplon's experiment had no major statistical shortcomings. But their only reliable conclusion important for us is that four one-quarter pieces of popcorn produce higher levels of performance than one one-quarter piece. This fact does not take one far; certainly one point allows no curve to be drawn relating amount of incentive to level of performance.
The only published record of Gantt's experiment is a one-page note (3). Hull bases some of his interpretations upon a personal communication. These circumstances make the study difficult to evaluate. Hull reports, however, nothing about the statistical significance of the points to which a curve is fitted. The curve represents data upon one selected dog, selected because not all of the animals showed any consistent success in the situation. One selected dog, need it be pointed out, is a precarious basis for generalization.
In the series of experiments by the writer careful attention was devoted to the avoidance of the statistical and methodological weaknesses discussed above. Drive was equalized for the groups of rats obtaining different amounts of incentive by feeding them individually, after the experimental run, up to a constant amount (varying with body weight), including the amount of food obtained in the experimental run. This procedure left each rat just before his test run with a 22-hour deprivation from a weight maintenance ration. The period of occurrence of hunger contractions was not left to chance, but was conditioned to the time of experimentation. To prevent intertrial variation of drive each rat was limited to one trial per day.
The amounts of food incentive that the different groups of rats received varied from one unit (1/SOth of a gram of Purina biscuit) to 256 units (5 grams plus). This variation in terms of the average maintenance diet of the rats encompassed about 70 per cent of thenappetitive range.
The experiments were so designed that, through analysis of variance, rigorous statistical evaluation could be made of all results. The initial exploratory experiment revealed that the effects of amount of incentive upon performance were so substantial that small sample analysis was indicated as the most efficient approach.
In the following appraisal of Hull's treatment of the problem of amount of incentive or reinforcement it should be remembered that whatever specific criticisms are made of the studies Hull draws upon are in addition to the general faults which have been described.
III. AMOUNT OF REINFORCEMENT AND LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE
Hull bases his views of this problem primarily upon two investigations. The first, that of Gantt (3) on dogs, yields a curve relating amount of food reward used at each reinforcement of four conditioned responses to as many different stimuli, to the final mean amount of salivary secretion evoked by each stimulus at the limit of training. Hull stresses that this function (5, p. 125) is not to be confused with a learning curve; each point represents the final horizontal portion or asymptote of a separate and distinct curve of learning. From the second study, that of Grindley (4), Hull gives a curve (5, p. 126) he has fitted to data relating speed in a runway to number of grains of rice received as reward by the chickens employed in the study.
The relationship between amount of reinforcement and level of performance Hull envisages from Gantt's and Grindley's data to be a simple positive growth function, 3 such that "rate of learning [or level of performance as the writer puts it for reasons that shall be later discussed] is an increasing monotonic function of the amount of the agent employed at each reinforcement" (5, p. 127). In some critical respects the writer's findings do not bear out Hull's conclusion. Figure 1 depicts the curve the writer obtained, as an average of three experiments, relating level of performance to amount of incentive. How does it compare with the Hull-Grindley curve? * 3 This is a function of the type Hull now proposes as characterizing all learning curves, N namely, -p-Hs -Afe*" where BHB is habit strength, if is the physiological maximum of habit strength, N is the number of repetitions of the reinforcement, and i = log . _ j? where P is a constant fraction of the difference between the physiological maximum of habit strength (M) and the habit strength immediately preceding the reinforcement. 4 Conveniently for this comparison the measure of level of performance for both the writer's and Grindley's experiment was speed of locomotion down a runway, and the units of incentive amount were probably roughly similar in terms of the per cent of the appetitive range of the animals involved, grains of rice for Grindley's chicks, 1/SOth grams of Purina for the writer's rat. This curve is a mean outcome of three experiments. Each point, including that at zero incentive, represents the post-learning level of performance manifested by groups of rats receiving the amounts of incentive indicated.
It was the writer's original intention to place the Hull-Grindley curve, after differences of size had been compensated for, side by side with his own on Fig. 1 for comparison of shape. But on the scale necessary to properly represent his results it seemed of little value to diagram the Hull-Grindley curve since it became simply an almost vertical line pushed up against the Y axis which, at the limit of its rise, turned over sharply to a presumed asymptote. This latter curve is grossly different from Hull's picture of the function. Why does such a difference arise when the range of the amount variable on the abscissa is made to comprise a substantial portion of the appetitive range instead of just six grains of rice?
The difference occurs because the Hull-Grindley curve would have us believe that the increase in level of performance with increase in amount of reinforcement approaches an asymptote, i.e., may not go any higher, within a food amount range of less than six grains of rice. In other words, within but a scratch on the surface of the appetitive range of the chicken, food amount, it is contended, has already exerted its greatest possible effect upon level of performance. The writer's results completely controvert such an unlikely state of affairs. His curve, disregarding for the moment the low end reversal, does appear to be a function of the simple growth type as Hull surmised, but the rate of increase, or F in Hull's terminology, is far smaller than would be implied by Grindley's data. These results, the writer feels, are more credible in that they show that amount of in-centive progressively increases level of performance over some 70 per cent of the appetitive range of the animal before the gains begin to approach a maximum. If the increments of level of performance approached an asymptote as fast as Hull seems to believe, there would be no difference in level of performance for almost the entire appetitive range. And it would be letting the tail wag the dog to conclude, as does Hull, that "the rate of learning (level of performance) is an increasing monotonic function of the amount of the agent employed at each reinforcement" (5, p. 127).
It is likely that Hull has been led to such an improbably early limit in his graph of the relationship between amount of reinforcement and level of performance because of the following two reasons: (a) The minute range of amounts of reinforcement (one to six grains of rice) and the unreliable points in Grindley's experiment obscured the fact that with larger amounts of reinforcement the gains in level of performance have every likelihood of going much higher. To observe the unreliability of the points one has only to turn to Grindley's learning curves (4, p. 174), from which Hull fitted his growth function. The curves taken as a group are not very far apart; they crisscross again and again, and Grindley appends to his own generalization, "But there were wide individual differences in behavior" (4, p. 175). Hull himself admits that the deviation of Grindley's points from the growth function he fitted to them are 'considerable.' A small change in the position of a point or two might have totally altered the picture, (b) Unlike Gantt's curve (to be discussed shortly) which related level of performance to amount of reinforcement only after the changes in learning for the animals receiving each amount of reward were complete, Hull's curve from Grindley's data was based upon an average of the responses of the animals to the different amounts of food from the third to the seventh trial. This period, as an examination of Grindley's learning curves indicates (4, p. 174), was at the very outset of learning when learning changes were largest, and when, as has been said, the performance of each of the groups going to the different incentive amounts was still highly variable (as can be seen from the crisscrossing of the learning curves). But apart from the general dangers of fitting a function to such variable and unreliable data, the writer has found in his learning curves that it often takes more than three trials to allow the differential in reinforcement full opportunity to get in its effect upon level of performance. If a cross-section of the learning curves for different amounts of reinforcement is taken at such an early stage of learning, the gain in level of performance with increased amounts of reinforcement is likely to be clouded by the fact that the animal has not yet had sufficient experience with the situation to develop a clear appreciation of the size of the reward he may reliably expect.
Let us turn now to consider Gantt's curve which Hull cites as his second source of evidence as to the relationship between level of performance and amount of reinforcement. These data, it will be seen, do not compel the writer to alter his contention based on the comparison of his results with Grindley's that the gains in level of performance, in disagreement with Hull, approach an asymptotic limit not early but late in the appetitive range of the animal concerned.
Gantt's measure of performance was quite different from speed in a runway; it was rather the amount of conditioned salivary secretion given by a dog to four stimuli respectively reinforced with onehalf gram, one gram, two grams, and twelve grams of food. A simple growth function, it would appear, describes the relationship between the two variables. The level of performance as the function is fitted by Gantt seems to be approaching an asymptotic limit at approximately the 12-gram amount of reinforcement. As 12 grams of food to a dog is in all probability but little greater a percentage of his appetitive range than is six grains of rice to a chick, Gantt, like Grindley, appears to find, contrary to the writer's results, that the effect of amount of reinforcement upon level of performance has its maximum at almost the very outset of the appetitive range. It would be a mistake, however, the writer feels, to take this result too seriously. For the whole argument for the function turning over toward an asymptote between two and twelve grams hinges upon one point from one selected dog. Certainly more evidence than this is needed for generalization. Further, it is worth repeating here, from the general criticisms of Gantt's experiment, that there was no assurance of adequate control of drive. Since Gantt used several trials per day it is quite possible that variation in drive entered to distort his results.
Finally, there is, of course, the possibility that amount of reinforcement affects a performance like conditioned secretion quite differently than it does one like runway speed. But with Gantt's results so insecurely established it would be premature to take this easy tack as an explanation of the differences between Gantt's findings and those of the writer.
Having now concluded the criticisms of Hull's placement of an asymptotic limit so early in his growth function, let us now turn to another feature of Fig. 1 . In this curve, from the zero amount of reinforcement to the four unit amount, a dip in level of performance can be observed with a minimum at one unit reward. If this minute-incentive dip can be substantiated, it forces another modification of Hull's conception of the relationship of level of performance to amount of reinforcement.
The results as shown in Fig. 1 in the region of zero incentive up to 16 units incentive are composed of the average of two experiments. In Experiment I a different group of rats was started directly at each of the various incentiveamounts and, after learning changes had ceased, the level of performance was ascertained for each amount group. In Experiment II all the rats were started at 16 units incentive and then when their performance had stabilized (learning changes ceased), separate groups were shifted down to zero, one, and four units incentive, at which amounts, when the variability introduced by the change had diminished, the associated levels of performance were ascertained.
With these considerations in mind, the evidence can now be presented for the conclusion, pictured in Fig. 1 , that rats run faster with a complete absence of incentive than with a very small incentive. The first source of evidence is quantitative, the comparison of the levels of performance, in Experiment II, of the animals receiving no food incentive with those receiving a minute food incentive (one unit). The no-incentive group, it was found, exhibited a higher level of performance significant at better than the three per cent level (t = 2.33).
A second source of evidence lies in a series of qualitative observations which revealed that the receipt of a minute amount of incentive is productive of a number of behavior patterns indicative of frustration. The qualitative behavior patterns observed involved the following components: peering, scurrying, jerking of the head and body, biting of objects, jumping, face-washing, grooming, scratching of the body, prolonged smelling, and fitful retracting. The appear-ance of frustration in the various small incentive groups was distributed as follows: (1) The unit incentive group of Experiment I, and to a smaller extent the four-unit incentive group, began to manifest the frustration symptoms around the twelfth daily trial. From that time to the end of the experiment the symptoms became more pronounced in form and general in the group. (2) In Experiment II, about four trials after the shift from 16 units incentive, these same symptoms began to appear in the unit incentive group and to a smaller extent in the four unit group, growing more pronounced in form and general in the groups to the end. The prevalence and amount of these behaviors, particularly of the more violent kinds, as jumping to get out of the apparatus near the food box and biting the apparatus, were appreciably greater in the one and four unit incentive groups of Experiment II than in the corresponding groups in Experiment I. (3) In the group shifted in Experiment II from 16 units incentive to none, there was hardly any appearance of the frustration symptoms, particularly of the more violent forms (2, p. 497).
These findings, both quantitative and qualitative, suggest that there is a frustration effect specifically associated with receipt of minute incentive amounts, particularly one unit and to a lesser extent four units, which is not associated with the receipt of large incentives nor with the complete absence of incentive. The very few occurrences of the frustration symptoms in the group receiving no incentive are adequately accounted for on other grounds, in terms of the procedure of Experiment II. This experiment, it has been pointed out, unlike Experiment I, involved a shift from 16 units incentive downward to zero, one, and four units. This downward contrast produces on its own account, as will be discussed later in this paper, some frustration and some depression of performance-a 'depression effect.' B If it is granted that there is a frustration factor associated with the receipt of a very small incentive which is not associated with the complete absence of an incentive, can it be explained? A reasonable hypothesis is as follows: Obtaining a minute amount of food (a) arouses anticipatory emotional tensions without allowing any appreciable resolution, and (b) serves to remind the animal of his hunger, thus possibly stimulating his hunger drive without, however, improving his chances for obtaining more food. Hence, after the rat obtains the small incentive, he must remain in a state of heightened tension for an (to him) indefinite period (it will be remembered that the rats were fed an appreciable and variable amount after their daily test run was over). This state of heightened tension is unpleasant. Therefore, though food is present and the animal has had no food for some twenty-two hours, the situation is labeled 'frustrating.' If a frustration effect which dips the level of performance for minute incentive amounts below that associated with complete absence of incentive is so well established on both quantitative and qualitative grounds, why does not the dip appear in the Hull-Grindley curve? 8 That this 'depression effect' was present in Experiment II in addition to the direct frustration effect of minute incentives is supported by two considerations. First, the number of frustration symptoms in the one and four unit incentive groups of Experiment II was substantially greater than in Experiment I, where only the direct frustration of minute incentives was operating. Secondly, though the rats of Experiment II were natively faster (because younger) than those of Experiment I, as revealed by a significant difference in speed under the same conditions at the 16 unit incentive level (t = 2.26), their speed advantage, presumably because of the depression effect of downward contrast, was lost after their shift from 16 units incentive down to four or one.
The answer is, in all probability, that Grindley simply discarded the effect. To quote the previous remarks of the writer on this subject (2, p. 498): "In Grindley's study the significant statement is found that 'some of the chicks were found to develop a dislike for rice during the experiments.' Thirteen chicks or more than 25 per cent of the entire group were discarded because of this dislike. It is extremely likely that these chicks were only expressing the behavioral results of frustration upon receiving such small incentives (one, two, four, or six grains of rice). And Grindley, instead of studying this phenomenon on its own account, threw these chicks out of the investigation." With such a likely explanation it is hardly necessary to suggest as an alternative that Grindley with only seven learning trials might have given the frustration effect insufficient time to appear. It will be remembered that in the writer's investigation with rats the effect did not appear until the twelfth trial. Wolfe and Kaplon in their check upon some portions of Grindley's findings used five successive trials twice a day. So frustration, derived as the writer explained it, could hardly have occurred.
Since the effect of zero incentive is covered in Gantt's curve by extrapolation instead of investigation, and since so little is available about the details of the experiment, it is hardly profitable to discuss it in this context. We know Gantt used more than one trial per day, however, so it would seem that a frustration effect would be thus precluded.
On the basis of the consideration advanced in this discussion the writer would tie to Hull's 'increasing monotonic function,' as a picture of the relationship between level of performance and amount of reinforcement, a minute reward reversal. The turn is due to the additional variable that enters at the low end of the amount of reinforcement scale. Hence the overall function cannot be characterized as monotonic, since with increase in the independent variable-amount of reinforcement-the dependent variable-level of performance -may show decrease as well as increase.
To sum up this section of the paper the writer would suggest as emendations to Hull's generalization that level of performance "is an increasing monotonic function of the amount of the agent employed at each reinforcement" (5, p. 127), (a) associated with the receipt of minute amounts of incentive there is a dip of level of performance below that characterizing larger incentives or complete absence oi incentive* and (b) beyond this minute incentive region, level of performance, when learning changes have levelled out, is an increasing function approaching asymptotically to a limit not at the outset but deep in the appetitive range of the animal concerned.
IV. AMOUNT OF REINFORCEMENT AND NUMBER OF REINFORCEMENTS
Let us now consider the effects of amount of reinforcement upon the learning curves as evidenced by groups of animals running to different amounts of incentive. As has been previously stated, Hull's fundamental assumption (5) is that all learning curves will be simple growth functions of the number of reinforcements (N), mathematically of the form M-Me iN where M is the asymptotic limit of growth or learning, and i = log « _ p where F is a con-« By complete absence of incentive is meant of course absence of the material which is presumed to be the major interest of the animal at the moment, i.e., in the writer's experiments, food. It must not imply that there might not be other minor incentives present as, for example, escape from the situation. stant fraction of the difference between the physiological maximum of habit strength (M) at the particular amount of reinforcement and the habit strength immediately preceding reinforcement. Cast into Hull's terminology the problem of this section becomes: What effect does amount of reinforcement have upon the parameters M and F of the learning function? The answer to this question, of course, can only be obtained from systematic learning curves under different amounts of reinforcement. Regretting the fact that "unfortunately no such investigation has yet been reported in detail" (5, p. 128), Hull offers a few surmises based upon Gantt's and Wolfe and Kaplon's data. He suggests as a hypothesis that an increase in the quantity of a reinforcing agent increases the rate of learning by raising the limit (M) to which the curve of habit strength approaches as an asymptote. The rate of approach (F) to this limit, Hull suggests, possibly remains constant for different amounts of the reinforcing agent.
An investigation relative to which this hypothesis can be tested has been reported in detail by the writer (2). The learning curves are reproduced in Fig. 2 . One would only have to smooth these curves to see that they approximate Hull's hypothesis as to what would ob- The cross-section curve is drawn at 17% reinforcements since it is intended to correspond to Fig. 1 which was plotted from the mean results of the 15th to 20th daily trials.
tain under the circumstances. 7 From inspection each curve appears to fit into Hull's generic learning function, and the learning curves for different amounts of reinforcement seem to be similar in F, the fractional rate of growth for each particular amount of reinforcement.
To this substantial confirmation of Hull's expectations about the relationship of amount of reinforcement to the learning function, cautions must be appended. At the lower amounts of reinforcement {e.g., one and four units in the writer's experiments) one must be T The correlation of the variability in these curves, particularly in the leveling off period, reveals that the causes of variability are in large part extraneous, affecting the three curves similarly, rather than intrinsic to differences in amount of incentive. Hence smoothing is a fair procedure. prepared for complexities. To give but one, performance for the lower incentive amounts shows considerable variability, as compared to larger reinforcements, both among individuals and from trial to trial.
V. LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE, AMOUNT OF REINFORCEMENT, AND NUM-BER OF REINFORCEMENTS
In Fig. 1 amount of reinforcement was related to level of performance at the limit of learning. In Fig. 2 the relationship between the two variables was pictured longitudinally-during the course of the learning process. These two graphs can be tied together into one integrated view by a three-dimensional representation. This surface appears as Fig. 3 . For greater clarity and sim-plidty the constituent points of Figs. 1 and 2 are not represented, only smoothed curves. The longitudinal learning curves for different amounts of reinforcement, and the cross-sectional view of the relationship between amount of reinforcement and level of performance, 8 when learning changes have largely reached an end, can be clearly seen here in their interrelationships. The crosssection curve through the learning curve maxima is itself approaching an asymptotic limit, but deep in the appetitive range. The cross-section curve is a growth function except for a low end complexity-a minute incentive reversal.
This surface, the writer believes, is a good first approximation to the interrelationships among the three variables. It is only a first approximation, however, for at least three reasons: (1) More overall work is needed to fill in the gaps; (2) the region below 16 units incentive is certainly idealized as groups running to one and four units of incentive are highly variable, and (3) the minute incentive dip in level of performance might not persist for groups started out at small and zero incentives instead of shifted down after they had stabilized their performance at 16 units incentive.
VI. LEARNING VERSUS PERFORMANCE
The opening problem raised in this paper was the relationship between amount of reinforcement and level of performance. Implicit in the writer's use of the phrase, 'level of performance/ is a disagreement of conceptualization with Hull. This disagreement has been deliberately held in abeyance until differences in facts could be reconciled. 8 The cross-section curve shown on this surface is not quite the same as that represented in Fig. 1 as in the region beyond 16 units incentive it is drawn from the data of Experiment in instead of being an average curve from three experiments. This procedure was followed because all the longitudinal curves are from Experiment III.
Where the writer has generally used the term level of performance in denoting the dependent variable, Hull would speak in terms of level or rate of learning. The different levels of activity (runway speed in Grindley's and in the writer's experiments) associated, at the limit of practice, with different amounts of reinforcement Hull conceives of as differences in learning or habit strength (BHR in Hull's notation). Hull metricises this learning variable by defining one hab (short for habit) to be one per cent of the physiological maximum (M) or 'total possibility of learning' under optimal conditions. The writer cannot object to Hull's scientific procedure in inferring from observable speed of response effects upon an 'intervening variable' or logical construct. But he can object as to which intervening variable is most properly concerned. Changes in the longitudinal curve with N (number of reinforcements), the writer agrees, properly represent learning-growing mastery of the situation. And the difference between two curves where neither has yet leveled off and one group has had fewer trials than another is a learning difference. But differences between the two curves when both have leveled out, 'at the limit of practice,' the writer insists, are not differences in habit strength as Hull would say, they are substantially differences in drive strength. They are not differences in learning, but differences in performance which depend upon learning and drive determination. Hull defines (M) as a physiological limit of habit strength under optimal conditions which equals 100 habs. The limit of habit strength when amount of reinforcement is not optimal (M') is stated to be less than 100 habs. The writer feels that Hull is not justified in referring to M' as having less habit strength than M (say 80 habs) because it represents a lesser speed of response. M' being the limit of response with unlimited practice at a particular amount of reinforcement is, like M, complete learning. But since the amount of incentive obtainable in this case is low, motivation is low, and consequently speed of response suffers. The learning or habit strengths may be for both M and M' substantially the same. The performances are different because the drives are different. The differences seem to be more, if one can be anthropomorphic for the moment, in desire to reach the goal, not in acquired skill necessary to reach the goal. Both groups have mastered the requisite skill.
VII. AN EAGERNESS THEORY OF INCENTIVE MOTIVATION
Hull might retort to the arguments which have been given that drive has been held constant for the groups receiving different amounts of reinforcement. Consequently differences in level of performance cannot be attributed to this factor. But has drive been held constant? True hunger drive has been held constant, and very carefully. Is this, however, the only source of drive the organism possesses? The writer wishes to present the thesis that emotional drive has been varying among the groups of animals running to the different amounts of incentive, and this factor rather than simply learning is the major determinant of differences in levels of performance. With varying incentive amounts, after they have been experienced of course, there arise among the groups of animals varying amounts of anticipatory tension or excitement at the prospect of their acquisition. This is a differential of what may be termed eagerness. This differential of eagerness, of emotional tension or anticipatory excitement for the various amounts of incentive generates, according to this hypothesis, the differences within each trial in the obtained curves of performance. The larger the incentive amount for which an animal is performing the more eager he is to attain it, i.e., the more emotional drive is summating with his hunger drive to motivate his response. Eagerness is related to learning only in the sense that the animal must find out how much incentive he is obtaining before he exhibits a corresponding amount of eagerness.
The eagerness value associated by an animal with a particular amount of incentive, after he has come to expect it, 9 is by hypothesis a function of the appetitive range of the animal. A particular amount of incentive is appraised as large, moderate, or small according to whether it results in a large, moderate, or small diminution of hunger pangs. This appraisal generates a corresponding amount of eagerness at the prospect of attainment.
The argument so far for an emotional drive or eagerness determinant of the differences of level of performance associated with the receipt of different amounts of incentive lies in its plausibility and the weakness of Hull's alternative (which will later be shown). There is, however, some qualitative data tending to support the thesis. In running rats to 16, 64, and 256 units of incentive the writer observed that the 64 and the 256 unit group were considerably more excited when being brought to the starting box, in the the food boxmore eager-than was the 16 unit group. No appreciable difference was noted in the eagerness of the 64 compared to the 256 unit group. But then it must be remembered (vide Fig. 1 ) that their levels of performance were not very much different either. To crude observation any subtle differences in eagerness would be lost. In another experiment the one 9 In a later section of this paper it will be indicated that eagerness bears a more complex relationship to incentive amount if the amount is greater or less than that expected. and four unit incentive amount groups showed less eagerness for a time than the larger incentive amount groups. But this was complicated later, particularly for the unit incentive group, by rising excitement associated with minute incentive frustration.
Further support to this emotional drive interpretation of incentive motivation is obtained by a comparison of the effects upon behavior of food incentive variation with those of food drive variation. If, as the writer contends in disagreement with Hull, the apparently different situations are really both cases of drive variation, broadly similar results should obtain. Conveniently, such a comparison is possible as Hull discusses in detail the effect upon action of food drive variation (5, ch. 14).
Hull's discussion of drive variation is based upon data by Williams (15) and Perrin (9) relating number of hours of food privation (drive) to number of reinforcements and level of behavior. The measure of the latter was in this case the number of unreinforced responses which albino rats would make before their response was extinguished. Hull drew (5, p. 229) a three-dimensional graph or surface depicting behavior as a joint function of the other two variables, amount of food drive and the number of reinforcements of the habit in question. Now if incentive variation operates through the same mechanism as drive variation, as might follow from the writer's contention that both are really drive variations, the incentive surface of the writer's (Fig. 3) should be similar 10 to Hull's drive surface.
The comparison of the two surfaces- 10 They need not be identical even if a common drive mechanism underlies the two as the behaviors in question are somewhat different, but to the extent that there is a similarity, the writer feels, his contention gains strength. For both surfaces the asymptotes of the longitudinal curves (Af"s) are increasing functions of the motivation variable, but the rates of approach (F's) are constant. The only major difference besides some zero-end extrapolations (which can probably be attributed to the difference in the indices of behavior employed for the dependent variable) is that, for the incentive surface, level of performance is not a slightly positively accelerated function of the motivation variable, as in Hull's (5, Fig. 49 ), but is negatively accelerated. This last difference does not weaken the case for the writer's suggestion that the effect of incentive variation upon performance is really through the mechanism of drive variation. This difference, using Hull's own reasoning, strengthens the argument. For Hull says in his theoretical discussion of the relationship of drive intensity to the conditions which produce it (5, p. 240), "It seems likely, on the basis of various analogies, that, other things equal, the intensity of the drive stimulus would be some form of negatively accelerated increasing function of the concentration of drive substance in the blood" (Italics the writer's).
Hull further cites the elaborate study of Warden and his associates (13) to the effect that hunger drive up to two or three days of food privation is a negatively accelerated function of time.
The comparison just completed and the preceding arguments make plausible the hypothesis that variations of amount of incentive operate to influence performance through the agency of varia-tion of emotional drive or anticipatory eagerness. If this is granted the differences in levels of action in Fig. 2 occasioned, over a series of trials, by different amounts of reinforcement cannot be looked upon as caused by differences in habit strength or learning alone, but must be understood as owing also to differences in drive strength. This point Hull understands very well in regard to Williams' and Perrin's data wherein drive is obviously varying. In these cases he terms the behavior not an index of learning alone (SHR) but an index of performance, or in his terminology reaction potential (SER) which is determined by a function of drive [F(D)] as well as by a function of habit strength [J(SHR) j. The same conceptualization should be applied according to the writer's hypothesis to cases of incentive variation, for here too drive is varying though perhaps not so obviously.
The major theoretical discovery that Hull feels is indicated by his three-dimensional analysis of Perrin's data is that the relationship between drive, reaction-potential, and habit strength or learning is multiplicative, i.e., SER = KBHR) Xf(D).
It adds no small weight to the writer's contention that incentive motivation should be included in the concept of D to find that with such inclusion apparently the same equation substantially holds.
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This multiplicative relationship means that with any cross-section cut of Hull's surface-/(SHR) is thus made a constantvariation of SER IS occasioned entirely by f{D).
With a longitudinal cutj{D) is thus held constant-the varia- 11 It must be kept in mind, however, that the effect of amount of incentive upon the learning function does not become consistent until after a few opening trials. This is easily understood as the experience necessaiy for the different incentive amount groups to build up the different amount expectations and thus to get the different associated eagerness values operating consistently. tion in SER is occasioned entirely by
/(SHR).
Further, this multiplicative relationship implies that these functions, /(SHR) and /(/?), are the same wherever the cut is taken.
VIII. CONTRAST-SHIFTS IN AMOUNT OF REINFORCEMENT AND LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE
This final section of the paper is concerned with the effects upon levels of performance of shifting animals which have been accustomed to one amount of reinforcement to another amount, both when the second amount is greater and when it is less. Hull discusses what would follow under these circumstances from his 'learning' theory of incentive motivation by the use of which he has explained the findings discussed in this paper about the differences in levels of performance associated at the limits of practice with different amounts of reinforcement. This theory assumes that (1) the "successful reaction will be more strongly conditioned to the stimulus aggregate arising from a large piece of food than to that from a small one," and (2) "Therefore given a normal hunger drive, the organism will execute the correct one of several acts originally evoked by the situation more promptly, more vigorously, more certainly, and more persistently when a large amount of food is stimulating its receptors than when they are stimulated by a small amount" (5, pp. 131-132). The writer has already rejected this strength-ofconditioning theory of incentive motivation in favor of an emotional drive or eagerness theory on the grounds, it was stated, of the weakness of Hull's theory. It is with regard to shift of incentive results, it will presently be seen, that Hull's view seems inadequate.
Hull poses in his discussion the problem of an upward shift of incentive (5, pp. 129-130 and Fig. 29) . If a group of animals are given one gram of rein-forcement over a number of trials their level of performance will describe a learning curve or growth function which reaches an asymptote-the one-gram limit of performance. Similarly for a six-gram group except that the six-gram limit will be higher in habit strength (greater speed in a runway for example). Now Hull says, if, after 15 trials, the animals receiving one gram of food are shifted to six grams the change in their performance will describe a growth function whose asymptote is the six gram limit. 12 In his chapter on amount of reinforcement Hull does not give detailed consideration to the parallel case where amount of incentive is suddenly reduced. He states instead that it must be deferred until experimental extinction has been discussed. But, unfortunately, as far as the writer can ascertain, the topic has not been treated. The implication of Hull's theory seems to be, however, that with downward shift of amount of reinforcement, say from six grams to one gram, the level of performance would descend to the one gram limit.
What happens to these implications of Hull's learning theory of incentive motivation? If they are not borne out, the theory must be brought into question. In the light of experiments of the writer on precisely this problem, effect of shift of incentive amounts upon level of performance, Hull's deductions are sharply controverted. For groups of animals shifted upward from both one unit and four unit incentive to 16, and downward from 256 unit or 64 unit incentive to 16, the resulting changes in level of performance are definitely contrary to those demanded by Hull's theory. These facts can be clearly seen in Figs. 7 and 8 of the writer's paper (2, p. 508). Both of the groups which " This contention is dearly evident in the equation that has been given for the shifted group's growth function (5, p. 134).
were shifted upward in amount of reinforcement substantially and reliably shoot above the level of performance characteristic of the 16 unit group at the limit of practice. This is what the writer has termed the 'elation effect.' Similarly both groups shifted downward in amount of reinforcement substantially and reliably drop below the level of performance characteristic of the control group at their limit of practice. Here there is what the writer has termed the 'depression effect.' These elation and depression effects run definitely counter to the results anticipated by Hull's learning-theory of incentive motivation, but the writer feels they fit in well with his own emotional drive or eagerness theory.
According to the writer's proposal as has been previously stated, a particular incentive amount, after an animal has come to expect it, bears a particular eagerness value or anticipatory excitement. What this value is depends upon the relation of the amount of incentive to the appetitive range of the animal concerned. This amount of eagerness is the emotional drive associated with a particular amount of incentive when level of achievement is equal to level of expectation. But when level of achievement is appreciably greater, for example, than level of expectation, as is the case with upward shift in amount of reinforcement, background emotional drive gets a boost aroused by the discrepancy (elation or joy), and the vigor of performance is increased.
One has only to reflect upon his own reactions to see how reasonable an assumption is this elation boost in emotional drive. If one is doing a task for a dollar reward and suddenly and unexpectedly receives five dollars for the same task, he is likely to be elated and his level of performance will rise. There is no reason to expect other animals to react dissimilarly.
A boost in emotional drive because of an unexpected increase in reward may account for the elation effect in level of performance, the depression effect with one additional complexity may be accounted for similarly. When an animal suddenly receives a reward less than he expected for a certain task, there is also, the writer believes, a boost in emotional excitement, but what might be anthropomorphically termed anger instead of joy. The emotional surge of stimulation under these circumstances does not pour into the activity at hand to increase its vigor as in the elation effect, but pours into various goal-avoidant activities or frustration symptoms. This is not just speculation but is suggested by the following considerations from the writer's experiments. In the 16 unit incentive control group when performance had leveled out most of the rats went directly down to the food box. Occasionally there was pausing here and there in the runway, but there were very few long steps or retraces. Peering had by this time become rare. The first experience of change by the rats shifted down to 16 from 64 units incentive brought general excited peering in the food box, general delayed eating, one refusal to eat, and one persistent attempt to jump out of the food box. In subsequent trials, considerable peering and retracing around the starting box quickly arose, as did also retracing and jerky, hesitant locomotion. Among some rats prolonged smelling of the pathway and biting of the starting door were in evidence. The first experience of change among the rats shifted downward to 16 from 256 units of incentive occasioned general frantic peering, general delayed eating, repeated jumping attempts to escape the food box in three cases, and refusal to eat all or part of the incentive in three cases. Upon subsequent trials there was prolonged peering at the starting door, jerky hesitant locomotion, retracing, prolonged smelling, and door biting. On the first experience of the incentive shift, at least, the 256 unit incentive group exhibited substantially more disruption of behavior than did the 64 unit group (2, p. 510).
To summarize, in both the elation and depression effects activity appears to be augmented by a heightened emotional drive. But in the one case, elation, the added stimulation summates algebraically to increase the vigor of the goal activity above the level that would be the consequent of ordinary eagerness associated with the shifted-to amount of incentive. In the other case, anger, the added stimulation summates algebraically to decrease the goal-directed vigor below the level that would be the consequent of ordinary eagerness associated with the shifted-to incentive. The diminution of activity, discussed previously in this paper, associated with the receipt of minute rewards is also a case in which emotional drive, anger, aroused for Feasons that have been given, increases general activity but decreases goal-directed activity.
An implication of this hypothesis which invites verification is that the elation and depression effects after a number of trials should trail down to the level of performance characteristic of the shifted-to amount of incentive. This follows since with experience level of expectation would be brought into line with the new level of achievement, and consequently the emotional boost in drive due to their disparity would disappear, leaving as incentive motivation only the eagerness value characteristic of the particular amount of incentive in terms of the appetitive range of the animal. Examination of Fig. 8 (2, p. 508 ) of the writer's previous paper suggests that this implication will hold, since around the eighth post-shift trial the depression effect is already trailing back toward the level of performance char-acteristic of the shifted-to amount of incentive.
It is fitting to append to this appraisal of Hull's treatment of the relationship between amount of incentive and behavior a few remarks in regard to the spirit in which the criticisms are made. As Hull has stated, "A sharp and definite formulation has, in many cases, been given principles despite admitted doubt as to their precise validity. It is believed that a clear formulation, even if later found incorrect, will ultimately lead more quickly and easily to a correct formulation than will a pussyfooting statement which might be more difficult to convict of falsity" (5, p. 398). With this point of view the writer is in agreement. It is not a little due to Hull's precise formulations that the discrepancies between his treatment and that of the writer became apparent, and thus the need pointed out for their resolution. If Hull's discussion in the light of the criticisms of this paper can be looked upon in some respects as no more than a first approximation, the writer's is certainly no more than a second.
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